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no violation of principle in a court, even if thereby it does set aside
its former decision as inapplicable, and adopt a new one as suited
to the new phase of the controversy :" Wells, op cit. sect. 619;
Yates v. &nith, 40 Cal. 671, Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 Ind. 365.
X. AFFIRMANCE BY EQUALLY DIVIDED CouRT.-Where the
deliberations of the appellate court result in an affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court, in consequence of an equal division of
opinion among the judges, no binding precedent is thereby established. The judgment in such a case, although it is as conclusive
upon the rights of the parties to the litigation as any other would be
(Durant v. Essex 0o, 7 Wall. 107), is not considered as settling the
questions of law as to cases which may arise between other parties:
Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 285; Bridge v. Johnson, 5 Wend.
342.
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ABRATHv. NORTHEASTERN- RAILWAY COMPANY.
In an action of malicious prosecution, the burden of proving malice and the absence
of reasonable and probable cause is on the plaintiff.
The facts in this case held to warrant a finding of the presence of reasonable and
probable cause and the absence of malice on the part of the defendant.
Per Lord BRAMWELL: An action for malicious prosecution does not lie against a
corporation aggregate; such a corporation being incapable of malice or motive.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeal.

The facts are set out in the report of the case before the Court of
Appeal, 11 Q. B. D. 440. For the present purpose the following
brief statement will suffice: one McMann recovered from the respondents a large sum as compensation for personal injuries in respect of a
railway collision. Information having been given to the company's
directors they caused inquiries to be made by the company's solicitor.
The results of those inquiries were laid before counsel, who advised
that the appellant, Dr. Abrath, should be prosecuted for conspiring
with MocMann to defraud the company by falsely pretending that
McMann had been injured in the collision and by artificially manufacturing symptoms of injury. The respondents accordingly prosecuted appellant, who was acquitted. In an action brought by him
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a zainst the respondents for malicious prosecution, CAVE, J., directed
tL, jury that it was for the plaintiff to establish a want of reasonable and probable cause and malice, and that it lay on him to show
that the defendants had not taken reasonable care to inform themselves of the true facts of the case, and asked the jury whether they
were satisfied that the defendants did take reasonable care to inform
themselves of the true facts, and that they honestly believed in the
case which they laid before the magistrates. The jury answered
both questions in the affirmative, and CA E, J., entered judgment
for the defendants.
The Divisional Court, GRovE and LoPES, JJ., ordered a new

trial on the ground of misdirection (11 Q. B. D. 79). The Court
of Appeals (BRETT, M. R., and BowEN and FRY, LJJ.) reversed
this decision and ordered the judgment of CAvE, J., to stand (11
Q. B. D. 440). From this decision the plaintiff appealed.
Sir . Russell, A. G. and MaeClymont (H. Adkins with them),
for the appellant.
Digby Seymour, Q. C., Sir .Henry James, Q. C., Gainsford
Bruce, Q. C., and J. Lawson Walton, for the respondents were
not heard.
EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, the argument of the learned
counsel for the appellant has cleared up any difficulty which there
might have been as to the real grounds on which we should decide
this case. The question is really one of the weight of evidence,
and nothing else. The burden of satisfying the jury that there was
no reasonable and probable ground for the prosecution lies upon the
plaintiff. It is not now seriously disputed that it does.
The learned judge having left two questions of fact to the jury,
they found, first, that proper care had been used by the prosecutors
to inform themselves of the facts; and, secondly, that the prosecutors honestly believed the case which they laid before the magistrates.
In my judgment, the learned judge did not misdirect the jury,
and the Court of Appeal were right in their view of the law; and
the only question is, is there anry ground for saying that upon the
weight of evidence, the jury miscarried, and that a new trial ought
to be -directed ? Speaking for myself, I cannot imagine a more
hopeless case in that point of view. The railway compa.:. b
-
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determine whether or not they would institute this prosecution ;
and the evidence given by the gentleman who was acting for them
in the matter is, to my mind, as completely sufficient to negative
the idea of the absence of reasonable and proper care on the part of
the company to inform themselves of the facts as anything for the
purpose of an action of this sort can be.
The statements of certain persons were obtained, carefully considered and laid before counsel, and counsel advised a prosecution
upon those materials. A prosecution having been instituted, it was
thought by the magistrates, that the preponderance of evidence was
such that they ought to send the case for trial. Taking the evidence as it was presented to the railway company, to those who
advised them, and to the magistrates, it was a body of evidence
which it believed tended to prove the charge, and justified those
who believed it in making the charge in perfect good faith. How
can it be said that taking such a body of evidence as that, without
the suggestion, much less proof of the use of any fraudulent or
improper means to obtain it, shows a want of reasonable care on the
part of the company to inform themselves about the facts, I cannot
imagine. I connot conceive better primafacie evidence of reasonable care in that respect.
[His Lordship then discussed the evidence in detail, and concluded thus:] So far from thinking that there is a preponderance
of evidence against reasonable and probable cause, my doubt is
rather on the other side, whether on the whole evidence there was
really anything to go to the jury in favor of that conclusion.
I move your Lordships that the order appealed from be affirmed
and the appeal dismissed with costs.
LORD BRAMWELL: My Lords, I am of opinion that no action for
a malicious prosecution will lie against a corporation. I take this
opportunity of saying that as directly and peremptorily as I possibly
can ; and I think the reasoning is demonstrative. To maintain an
action for malicious prosecution, it must be shown that there was
an absence of reasonable and probable cause, and that there was
malice or some indirect and illegitimate motive in the prosecutor.
A corporation is incapable of malice or motive. If the whole body
of shareholders were to meet and in so many words to say, "1prosecute so and so, not because we believe him guilty, but because it
will be for our interest to do it," no action would lie against the
corporation, though it would lie against the shareholders who had
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given such an unbecoming order. If the directors even, by resolution at their board, or by order under the common seal of the company (I am putting the case plainly in order that there may be no
mistake about it), were maliciously, with the view of putting down
a solicitor who had assisted others to get damages against them, to
order a prosecution against that man, if they did it from an indirect
and improper motive, no action would lie against the corporation,
because the act on the part of the directors would be ultra vires ;
they would have no authority to do it. They are only agents for the
company; the company acts by them, and they have no authority to bind the company by ordering a malicious prosecution. I
say, therefore, that no action lies, even if you assume the strongest case, namely, that

of the very shareholders directing it,

or the very directors ordering it, because it is impossible that
a corporation can have malice or motive ; and it is perfectly
immaterial that some subordinate officer or individual or individuals of the company have such malice or motive. In the
case which I put an action would lie against the directors personally who had ordered an improper prosecution. It may be that no
action would lie against any subordinate who had malice and who
had not ordered or caused or procured the prosecution ; because
although the two ingredients existed which are necessary for the
maintenance of such an action, that is to say, malice and the
absence of reasonable and probable cause, yet in the case which I
surmise the man would not be a prosecutor; and unless you find
the absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice in him who
is the prosecutor an action is not maintainable. It is not enough,
therefore, to show that there was an absence of reasonable and
probable cause, and that the subordinate had malice, not that I for
a moment suggest that that is the case here.
In my opinion this is not merely what is commonly called a technical point; although, if a point were untechnical it would be very
objectionable. This is a substantial objection; because every one, or
every counsel or solicitor listening to me, knows that the only reason
why a railway company is selected for an adtion of this sort, is, that
a jury would be more likely to give a verdict against a company
than against an individual. Everybody knows it: and perhaps there
is a sort of hope of confusion. , It is said, "the man was innocent:,
somebody ought to be punished for it: here is a railway company:
there was an improper motive ;" and so there is a jumble; the case
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gets before a jury, and a railway company is exactly the party to
have damages awarded against it. If ever there was a necessity
for protecting persons, it is in an action for malicious prosecution,
and for two reasons, first of all, a prosecutor is a very useful person to the community. We have something in the nature of a public prosecutor, but everybody knows that the greater number of
prosecutions in this country, are undertaken not by the state, but
by private persons, or, as in this case, corporations.
One may venture to quote Bentham even upon this matter. He
said that laws would be of very little use, if there were no informers, and that it is necessary for the benefit of the public, that people when they prosecute, and prosecute duly, should be protected.
There is an additional reason. A man brings an action for malicious prosecution; he gives evidence which shows or goes to show,
that he is innocent. You may tell the jury over and over again
that that is not the question, but they never or very rarely can be
got to understand it. They think that it is not right that a man
should be prosecuted when he is innocent, and in the end they pay
him for it. It is, therefore, all important that these actions should
not be permitted to be brought against persons or bodies, or others
who are not properly liable in respect of them.
It may be said, " Well, but this is rather hard upon a man
who has been prosecuted, and improperly prosecuted." That is to
say, the corporation is innocent but its officers are guilty. But the
same thing happens in the case of an individual prosecutor. A
man receives false information: he prosecutes upon that information. The person who gave him the information is not liable, because he did not prosecute. He may be liable for the untrue
statement, because it may be slander, in the same way as he would
be liable if he charged an indictable offence against a person ; or
possibly, he may be liable for having procured the prosecution; and
it may be that in such a case as this, some of the people employed
by the company were actuated by an indirect motive; I do not say
that they were-it is impossible to say so-but what I say is, that it
is no harder upon a man that he has no remedy against a public
company that has prosecuted him, when the servants of the com*pany have been malicious, than it is that there is no remedy against
any individual man who has prosecuted, he having no malice, but
somebody who gave him information, having malice.
It is said that this is an old-fashioned sort of notion. It is: but
VOL. XXXIV.-96
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this opinion is one that I have entertained ever since I have known
anything about the law; and although it is an old-fashioned one, I
trust that it is one that will not die out, for the reasons which I have
given.
But it is said, " Well, but a variety of actions have been allowed
against corporations, which formerly did not exist." I deny it. It
is certain that a corporation may order a thing to be done which is
a trespass, because there the act of those who act for the corporation,
is not ultravires; for instance, take the case of false imprisonment;
a railway company gives somebody power to take up persons who,
it believes, are doing some wrong to the company. If a person is so
authorized, that is an authority which may be unreasonably exercised.
You cannot give an authority, maliciously, to prosecute, but you
may give an authority to take up persons who are cheating a railway company. If that person to whom authority is given, makes
a mistake and takes up a person who is not cheating, it may, in such
a case, be sid properly to be the act of the company, and they are
properly liable. But in that case there is neither malice nor motive,
in question. So, also, they may be liable for the publication of a
libel. That unfortunate.word " malice," has got into cases of actions
for libel. We all know that a man may be the publisher of a libel
without a particle of malice or improper motive. - Therefore, the
case is not the same as where actual or real malice is necessary.
Take the case where a person may make an untrue statement of a
man, in writing, not privileged on account of the occasion of its
publication ; lie would be liable, although he had not a particle of
malice against the man. So would a corporation. Suppose that
a corporation published a newspaper or printed books, and suppose
that it was proved against them, that a book so published had been
read by an officer of the corporation, in order to see whether it
should be published or not, and that it contained a libel; an action
lies there, because there is no question of actual malice or ill-will
or motive.
For these reasons, which I dwell upon at no great length, more
particularly as Mr. Maclymont did not cite any cases upon this
point, or go into it at all, I am clearly of opinion that this action
does not lie against this company.
But assuming that that difficulty did not exist, there is no absence
of reasonable and probable cause in this case. I doubt very much
whether CAVE, J. needed to have left to the jury, the question,
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whether reasonable care had been used. I doubt it very much,
indeed. I doubt very much whether he might not have said, I
will not say ought not have said to the jury, "If you are of opinion that these directors honestly believed the statements that were
laid before them, and honestly acted upon the opinions that were
given to them, there was not only no absence of reasonable and
probable cause, but it existed in abundance." However, he did put
the question, and the jury did answer it: and it does seem to me,
I must say, to be one of the strongest cases of an unfounded action,
that ever was brought, even for a malicious prosecution.
EARL OF SELBORNE.-My Lords, my noble and learned friend
opposite (Lord BRAMWELL) has raised a question which has not
been argued before your lordships, a question of the greatest importance, as to whether it is of the essence of an action of this sort
that malice should be proved in a sense not imputable to a corporation. The importance of that question would certainly have led
me, before I could arrrve satisfactorily at an opinion of my own
upon it, to desire to'have it argued. It has not been argued at your
Lordship's Bar. It was not, as far as I can see, a ground of decision in the court below. What has been said by my noble and learned
friend. I am sure, will have the weight due to all opinions of his
whenever the question comes to be solemnly examined; but I do
not think that your lordships' decision in the present case can properly be regarded as determining that question.
Order appealed from affirmed; and appeal dismissed with costs.
The position maintained so vehemently
by Lord BRA-aWELL in this caise, that a

corporation cannot be liable for torts involving intention, brings this important
question once more into prominence. Lord
BRAMWELL admitsthat actions oftort,like
trespass or trover, will lie against a corporation ; his point is, that a corporation
cannot be guilty of torts which involve a
wrongful intention, such as deceit or
malicious prosecution, because a corporation, being an imaginary person or entity,
is incapable of a wrongful intention.
Admitting a general liability in tort
on the part of corporations, he denies
that a corporation can ever, under any
circumstances, make itself liable for a

tort involving intention, even though the
entire body of directors or shareholders
unanimously order or ratify the tortious
act, for the simple reason that it is incapable of any wrongful intention whatever.
Lord BR.WELL admits that the
point discussed by him was not raised
in the argument of the case, and he
cites none of the authorities bearing upon
it. Let us, then, in the first place, see
how the views expressed by him stand
in the light of precedent, taking up first
the English precedents, and then the
American.
In Stevens v. Midland Counties Ry., 10
Ex. 352, it was sought to hold a corpora-
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tion liable in an action of malicious prosecution. Baron ALDRnsoN said, "It
seems to me that an action of this description does not lie against a corporation aggregate : for, in order to support
the action, it must be shown that the defendant was actuated by a motive in his
mind, and a corporation has no mind."
PrIAT and MARTIN, BB., did not decide this point, but held that the corporation was not liable, because its servant
who prosecuted did not act within the
scope of his authority in so doing.
In Green v. London GeneralOmnibus Co.
(limited), 7 C. B. (N. 8.) 290, the action
was case against a company established
for carrying passengers in omnibuses, for
maliciously and vexatiously obstructing
plaintiff in the carrying on of a similar
business. The declaration was demurred
to on the ground that a corporation can-.
not be guilty of an act involving malice
or bad intent. But the court say, " we
are clearly of opinion that the action lies;
and there are abundant authorities to
warrant that opinion. The whole course
of the authorities from Yarborough v.
Bank of England, 16 East 6, down to
Whitfield v. Southeastern By., E., B. &
El. 115, which was in reality an action
against the Electric Telegraph Company
-- shows that an action for a wrong will
lie against a corporation, where the thing
that is complained of is a thing done
within the scope of their incorporation,
and is one which would constitute an
actionable wrong if done by an individual.
The doctrine relied on by Mr. Gifford,
that a corporation having no soul, cannot be actuated by a malicious intention,
is more quaint than substantial.
In Goffv. Great Northern Ry., 3 El.
& El. 672, it was held that false imprisonment would lie against a corporation, if the person imprisoning plaintiff
had authority from the company to do'so.
In this case the point discussed by Lord
BRAMWELL was not distinctly raised,
but BrACXBuRN, J., delivering the
opinion of the court says, " A railway

company, though it be a corporation, is
liable in an action for false inprisonment,
if that imprisonment be committed by
the authority of the company; and it is
not necessary that that authority be
under seal."I
In Barwick v. .EnglishJoint Stock Bank.
L. R., 2 Exch. 259 (1867), it was held
that an action of deceit would lie against
a joint stock banking company for the
fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of its manager. The point of the
inability of a corporate bddy to have a
wrongful intention was not raised. The
court however say: "But with respect
to the question, whether a principal is
answerable for the act of his agent in the
course of his master's business, and for
his master's benefit, no sensible distinction can be drawn between the case of
fraud and the case of any other wrong."
In Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie,
L. R., I Sc. App. 145, which was an
action by a shareholder to rescind his
sharetaking contract, on the ground that
he was induced to enter into the contract
by the fraudulent misrepresentations of
the directors, the court, at p. 157, draw
the following distinction: "Where a
person has been drawn into a contract to
purchase shares belonging to a company
by fraudulent misrepresentations of the
directors, and the directors, in the name
of the company, seek to enforce that
contract, or the person who has been deceived institutes a suit against the company to rescind the contract, on the
ground of fraud, the misrepresentations
are imputable to the company, and the
purchaser cannot be held to his contract,
because a company cannot retain any
benefit which they have obtained through
the fraud of their agents. But if the
person who has been induced to purchase
shares by the fraud of the directors, instead of seeking to set aside the contract,
prefers to bring an action for damages
for the deceit, such an action cannot be
maintained against the company, but
only against the directors personally."
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See, also, New Brunswick 4- Canada Ry.
v. Conybeare, 9 H. L. C. 725.
Jfoore v. Metropolitan Ry., L. R., 8
Q. B. 36 (1872), follows Goff v. Great
Northern Ry., 3 El. & El. 672, supra,
and holds that a corporation may be
liable for a malicious prosecution instituted by its agent.
In the case of Henderson v. Midland
Ry., 20 W. R. 23, BRA31weLL, then a
Baron of the Court of Exchequer, said,
obiter, "Further, I am of opinion that
this form of action will not lie against a
corporation.
cannot understand how
malice can exist in a body corporate ; a
corporation aggregate must necessarily
be destitute of malice. The other Barons decline to express an opinion on thi§
point. KELLY, C. B., says: " A railway company must, from time to time,
prosecute, and may commit acts of oppression if they are not liable for not
prosecuting without reasonable and probable cause; if such be the law, it will
require amendment."
Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New
Brunswick, L. R., 5 P. C. 394. In this
case it was held that an action of deceit
would lie against an incorporated bank
for the fraudulent misrepresentation of
its cashier, made while acting within the
The cirt
scope of his employment.
advert to and decline to follow the distinction suggested in Western Bank of
Scotland v. Addie, supra, that a corporation is liable in certain cases in contract but never in tort, for the fraud of
its servants. The court expressly hold
that a corporation may be liable in deceit fdr the fraud of its servant, if committed while acting within the scope of
his employment; and they point out that
the words "scope of employment" are
used in a far broader sense than "scope
of authority," express or implied.
In Edwards v. MidlandRy., 50 L. J.,
Q. B. 281 (1880), the question whether
malicious prosecution would lie against a
corporation, was squarely raised. It was
argued that the case of Stevens v. Mid-

r

land Ry., supra, was a subsisting authority to the effect that a corporation, not
being possessed of mind, could not be
liable for malicious prosecution which involved mental state. FRY, J., after reviewing the authorities-dwelling especially upon Whitfield v. South Eastern
RBy., E., B.&E. 115, and Greenv. LondonOmnibus Co., 7 Com. B. (N. S.) 290,
supra, came to the conclusion that the
ratio decidendi of ALn nsor, B., in Stevens v. MidlandRy., supra-that a corporation cannot be guilty of a tort involving
intention,-had never been followed, and
that he was accordingly at liberty to decide according to what he conceived to
he the true view of the law. He held
that a corporation could be held liable
for malicious prosecution. The cases of
Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L.
R., I Se. App. 145, and Mackay v. Conmercial Bank of New Brunswick, L. R.,
5 P. C. 394, supra, were not noticed.
As the law stands to-day in England,
we have the express decision of one
learned judge (ALDERSON, B.), that
actions of tort involving a wrongful intent will not lie against corporations, supported by the extra judicial
opinions expressed by learned judges of
the House of Lords in at least three different cases. On the other hand, we
have express decisions of several Courts
of Appeal in at least five cases, that actions of this nature will lie against corporations. It would seem that the point
must be deemed unsettled in England, in
the absence of an express decision of the
House of Lords, although the preponderance of authority would seem to be
in favor of the liability of corporations
for torts involving wrongful intents.
In the United States, the law is perfectly well settled that corporations may
be held liable for torts involving wrongful intention.
Thus, in P. W. 4- B. Rd. v. Quigley,
21 How. 202, it was held that an action
of libel would lie against a corporation.
The Court say: " The defendants con-
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tend that toey are not liable to be sued
in this action ; that theirs is a railroad
corporation, with defined and limited
faculties and powers, and having only
such incidental authority as is necessary
to the full exercise of the faculties and
powers granted by their charter; that,
being a mere legal entity, they are ineapable of malice, and that malice is a
necessary ingredient in a libel ; that this
action should have been instituted against
the natural persons who were concerned
in the publication of the libel. To support this argument, we should be required to concede that a corporate body
could only act within the limits and according to the faculties determined by
the act of incorporation, and, therefore,
that no crime or offence can be impated
to it. That, although legal acts might
be committed for the benefit or within
the service of the corporation, and to
accomplish objects for which it was created by their dominant body, that such
acts, not being contemplated by their
charter, must be referred to. the rational
and sensible agents who performed them,
and the whole responsibility must be
limited to those agents, and we should
be forced, as a legitimate consequence,
to conclude that no action ex delicto or
indictment will lie against a corporation
for any misfeasance. But this conclusion would be entirely inconsistent with
the legislation and jurisprudence of the
states of the Union relative to these artificial persons. Legislation has encouraged their organization, as they concentrate and employ the intelligence, energy
and capital of the society for the development of enterprises of public utility.
The powers of the corpora* * * **
tion are placed in the hands of a governing body selected by the members, who
manage its affairs, and who appoint the
agents that exercise its faculties for the
accomplishment of the object of. its
being. But these agents may infringe
the rights of persons who are unconnected
with the corporation, or who are brought

into relations of business or intercourse
with it. As a necessary correlative to
the principle of the exercise of corporate
powers and faculties by legal representatives, is the recognition of a corporate
responsibility for the acts of those representatives :" Vinas v.Merchants' Mutual
Ins. Co. of New Orleans, 27 La. Ann.
367 ; sarmuels v. Evening Mail Co., 75
N. Y. 604 ; Evening Journal Ass'n. v.
McDermott, 44 N. J. L. 430; Detroit
Dairy Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich.
447 ; accord.
It is universally held that case for malicious prosecution will lie against corporations : Fenton v. Wilson Sewing Machine Co., 9 Phila. (Pa.) 189: Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn.
530 ; Williams v. Planters' Ins. Co., 57
Miss. 759 ; Wheless v. Second National
Bank, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 469; Boogher
v. Life Association of America, 75 Mo.
319 ; Iron Mountain Bank v. Mercantile
Bank, 4 Mo. App. 505; Copley v.
Grover, 4-c. Sewing Machine Co., 2
Woods 494; Vance v. Erie Rd., 32 N.
J. L. 334; Jordan v. Alabama Great
Southern Bd., 74 Ala. 85; Ricord v.
Central Pac. Rd., 15 Nev. 167 ; Reed v.
Home Savings Bank, 130 Mass. 443;
Morton v. Metropolitan Lfe Ins. Co.,
34 Hun 366 ; Kruleviti v. Eastern Rd.,
5 N. E. R. 500.
The only two cases holding that malicious prosecution will not lie against a
corporation because it cannot be guilty
of a malicious intent, (Gillett v. Missouri Valley Rd., 55 Mo. 315 ; and
Owsley v. M. 4- W. P. Rd., 37 Ala.
560), have been expressly overruled by
Boogher v. Life Association oj America,
supra, and Jordan v. Alabama Great
Southern.Rd., supra, respectively.
The following authorities hold that a
corporation is liable in an action of deceit, for the fraudulent misrepresentation
or concealment of its servants or agents:
Lamm v. Port Deposit Homestead Ass.,
49 Md. 233 ; Peebles v. Patapsco Guano
Co., 77 N. C. 233; Erie City Iron
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Works v. Barer, 106 Penn. St. 125 ;
Putler v. 11atkins, 13 Wall. 456;
New York, &c., Rd. v. Schuyler, 34 N.
Y. 30; National Bank v. Graham, 100
U. S. 699-702 ; Western Maryland Rd.
v. FranklinBank, 60 Md. 36.
Having examined the question of liability of corporations for torts, involving
intention from the standpoint of authority, let us now discuss it upon logical
grounds. It is argued in support of the
theory of non-liability of corporations
for torts of this class, that a corporation,
being an imaginary person, cannot have
"intention," because it has no "mind."

(See remarks of

ALDERSON,

B., in Ste-

vens v. Midland Rd., supra.)
But
clearly it must be admitted that corporations are not entirely without mind. A
corporation can act, and acting implies
mind, purpose, intention. So it seems,
that some degree of mind must be ascribed to that fictitious person called a
corporation. It may be claimed that a
corporation, being created or authorized
by law to perform certain functions only,
can be regarded as endowed with mind
sufficient for the performance of such
functions only.
This conception of a corporation is not
universally conceded to be the true one :
2 Morawetz Corp. sect., 648, et seq.
But even admitting it to be the true one,
and as a necessary consequence, that a
corporation cannot have a bad or wrongful intention, it does not follow that a
corporation cannot be guilty of malicious
torts in a large class of cases, i. e.,
where such torts are committed by its
servants or agents while acting "within
the scope of their employment."
There
certainly seems no reason why the principle of respondeat superior should not
apply as well where the master is a corporation, as where the master is an individual. And it is perfectly well settled,
that it does apply in the case where the
master is an individual. Now the theory
of respondeat stperior is not that the tortious conduct of the servant is ascribed

to or transferred to the master, but rests
on the broad ground of public policy. It
is an absolute rule of law creating, in
certain cases, a liability on the part of a
master for the wrongful act of his servant. This plainly appears from the
case of Sharrodv. Railway, 4 Exch. 580,
where it was held that the act of an engine-driver in running over sheep of the
plaintiff, was not the act of the railway
company, and that, therefore, the action
of trespass would not Lie against the
company for killing the sheep.
There would seem to be no reason why
the principle of respondeat superiorshould
not apply in the case of torts involving
wrongful or malicious intention, as well
as in the case of other sorts of torts.
Indeed, it seem conceded that it does, and
that a master is, in general, liable in
tort for the deceit, or fraud or malice of
his servants: Hern v. Nichols, I Salk.
289 ; Couqfort v. Fowke, 6 M. & W. 358,
373. Conceding, then, that the principle of respondeat superior does not rest
on the theory of imputing the acts of the
servant to the master, there would seem
to be no reason why a corporation should
not be held liable for the torts of its servants, involving malice or wrongful intention.
In this connection we may quote the
language of the court of Tennessee in
Whelen v. Second Nat. Bank, 1 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 469, where the court say : "It
would be an abandonment of the wellestablished principle of ' respondeat superior' to hold that the agents of a corporation, in discharge of their duties as
such, would be guilty of maliciously instituting suits to the damage of third
persons, and yet that the corporation
should shield itself from the responsibility by relying on its soulless character."
Also the language of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in Fogg v. Griffen, 2 Allen 1 : "A corporation can only
act through agents. If they, while exercising the authority conferred on them,

